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Abstract 
The reactivation of the Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA) represents one of 
the most important institutional initiatives in EU foreign policy-making since the merger of 
the position of the High Representative for CFSP with that of Vice-President of the 
Commission and the creation of the European External Action Service. This report examines 
the mandate and organisation of the CGEA and argues that, in its first year of activity, the 
Group has both injected much-needed political pragmatism into the way the Commission 
contributes to EU external action and has greatly facilitated inter-service cooperation, both 
within the Commission and with the EEAS. This is largely the result of the no-nonsense, 
hands-on approach adopted by HRVP Federica Mogherini and the way in which she has 
instrumentalised political will in an inter-institutional context. In the absence of a clearly 
stated vision of her own role as HRVP, an analysis of Mogherini’s joint statements, joint 
initiatives and visits with fellow Commissioners provides evidence that the contours of her 
position’s political space are determined by a pragmatic approach aimed at strengthening 
the cohesiveness of this multi-hatted role. 
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1. Introduction 
In a conflict-ridden world, the success of the European Union’s institutions in addressing 
challenges and seizing opportunities is helped by the constant revision of EU strategies, 
structures and working methods, as well as the focused support of and provision of 
resources by the member states. Arguably, without these elements, EU foreign policy 
flounders. The Union’s mixed performance in external action over the past few years is a 
reminder of the importance of the Lisbon Treaty, which was intended to create tools for the 
EU to develop a more coherent, effective and visible foreign policy.1 Those principles 
exemplify the ‘spirit’ of the Lisbon Treaty in the institutions’ day-to-day efforts to pull 
together the different strands of the Union’s external relations policies: from the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
laid down in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), to the EU’s trade policy, development 
policy, neighbourhood policies, crisis response and humanitarian aid, as well as the external 
dimensions of the internal policies enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU): migration, home affairs and citizenship; transport; climate action and energy; etc. 
The single-most important institutional innovation to meet the Lisbon Treaty’s overarching 
aims for EU external action has been the adaptation of the position of the High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), which 
from 1 December 2009 was combined with a position as Vice-President (VP) of the European 
Commission. Whereas considerable research has focused on the role of the HR and her (or 
his, as the case may be) supporting administration – the European External Action Service 
(EEAS; the second-most important innovation) – in extolling the virtues of inter-institutional 
cooperation in forging a more coherent external action,2 very little attention has been paid to 
the persona of the VP and her contribution to this hybrid position.3  
                                                     
* Steven Blockmans is a Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Professor of EU External Relations Law 
and Governance at the University of Amsterdam. Sophia Russack is an intern at the EU Institutions 
unit of CEPS. The authors would like to thank the interviewees from the Commission and the EEAS 
for taking the time to share their insights. 
1 See “Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and 
Visibility”, COM(2006) 278 final; the pre-Lisbon Draft IGC Mandate, annexed to the Presidency 
Conclusions of 22-23 June 2007; and the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament 
on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP (2008). See the ECFR’s European Foreign Policy 
Scorecards for Europe’s collective performance since 2011 (www.ecfr.eu/scorecard). 
2 See, e.g., G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and C. Rüger (eds), The High Representative for the EU Foreign 
and Security Policy: Review and Prospects, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012; P. Petrov, K. Pomorska and S. 
Vanhoonacker (eds), “Special Issue: The Emerging EU Diplomatic System: Opportunities and 
Challenges after ‘Lisbon’”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7:1, 2012; S. Blockmans and M.-L. Laatsit, 
2  BLOCKMANS & RUSSACK 
 
Originally intended to assess how the new incumbent has worn the VP hat in her first year of 
service (1 November 2014 – 31 October 2015), the aim of this paper has had to be adapted to 
reflect practical realities: from day one of her appointment, HRVP Federica Mogherini has 
embraced the Lisbon spirit in executing the multitude of tasks bestowed on her. She has been 
less interested in distinguishing between her various capacities and existing inter-service 
rivalries than in simply getting the job done. As a result, it has proved empirically unfeasible 
and academically indefensible to adopt a strict separation in the analysis of her several 
functions and to ring-fence her role as VP. While this may be problematic from a legal 
perspective,4 it is good news in policy terms. To her credit, Mogherini, supported by her staff 
in the EEAS and the Commission, has tried to make the best of the difficult task assigned to 
her – in a highly complex international environment. 
This paper therefore focuses on Mogherini’s overall contribution to the Juncker 
Commission’s stated aim of joining the dots between policies, structures and instruments in 
order to forge a more coherent external action for the EU. To that end, we first present the 
Treaty framework to the EU’s many actors on the international scene (section 2) before 
analysing the policy documents that guide the current Commission’s role in the realm of 
foreign affairs (section 3). This leads us to an analysis of the mandate, organisation and 
functioning of the Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA), the most important 
institutional innovation in the field of EU foreign policy since the creation of the HRVP 
position and the EEAS (section 4). This paper investigates the role of this cluster in the way 
the Commission contributes to EU external action and how Federica Mogherini has tried to 
instrumentalise political will in an inter-institutional context. An analysis of her joint 
statements, initiatives and visits with fellow Commissioners should provide further evidence 
of how she has approached her multi-hatted position (section 5). 
2. Treaty-based architecture 
In order to develop a more coherent, effective and visible EU foreign policy, the Lisbon 
Treaty introduced fundamental changes at two levels.5 Firstly, the objectives of the Union’s 
external policies, from security to development to trade and environment, were merged in 
Article 21 TEU. This could, over time, lead to more policy coherence. Secondly, the 
architecture and procedural framework for EU external action were fundamentally amended 
so as to enhance coherence between the institutional actors (see below). However, all these 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“The European External Action Service: enhancing coherence in EU external action?”, in P. Cardwell 
(ed.), EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era, The Hague: Asser Press, 2012, pp. 135-
159; and M. Emerson et al., “Upgrading the EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, law and the 
restructuring of European diplomacy”, CEPS, Brussels, 2011. 
3 A notable exception is S. Lange, “HR/VP to VP/HR? The next generation”, EUISS Brief No. 30, 28 
October 2014. 
4 See, e.g., S. Blockmans and C. Hillion (eds), “EEAS 2.0: A Legal Commentary on Council Decision 
2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service”, 
CEPS Special Report, 7 February 2013, note 28: “The pending case C-658/11 European Parliament v 
Council of the European Union on the EU agreement with Mauritius is a case in point: it has been 
suggested that the HR ought to intervene in support of the Council against the European Parliament, 
which is supported by the European Commission.” 
5 For a more detailed review of the Lisbon changes with regard to EU external action, see the 
contributions to P. Koutrakos (ed.), “The European Union’s External Relations A Year After Lisbon”, 
CLEER Working Paper 2011/3. 
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changes were introduced without simultaneously streamlining the distribution of 
competences or decision-making procedures.6 As has been observed recently, the Lisbon 
Treaty has not altered the first/second pillar dichotomy.7 Due to their ‘specific’ character, the 
CFSP and CSDP remain located in the Treaty on European Union, under the umbrella of the 
general provisions of the Union’s external action (Title V TEU) but are nevertheless separate 
from the Union’s other external relations policies in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(trade, development, cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, relations with 
international organisations, etc.).  
It was therefore left to the institutional actors of the EU to operate across the divide between 
the treaties and stimulate the drive for more policy coherence, effectiveness and visibility in 
external action. The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the Union’s foreign policy actors. One 
can point to the institutionalisation of the European Council (Article 13(1) TEU), which has 
been tasked with the identification of the strategic interests and objectives of the Union 
(Article 22(1) TEU), as well as the external representation of the Union at presidential level in 
the area of the CFSP (Article 15(6) TEU). Also, the European Parliament’s role in EU 
decision-making in foreign affairs has been enhanced, most notably with respect to the 
development of the Union’s trade policy (Article 27(2) TFEU). 
The most important institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty, however, relate to the 
position of the High Representative, who ‘conducts’ the Union’s foreign, security and 
defence policies (Article 18(2) TEU), contributes proposals to the development of those 
policies, and – together with the Council – ensures the member states’ compliance with their 
CFSP obligations (Article 24(3) TEU). Primary authority for policy choices in these areas 
continues to rest with the European Council and the Council (Articles 22-26 TEU, resp. 
Articles 26(2) and 28 TEU). The Commission remains responsible for policy initiation, 
implementation and external representation in the other (i.e. non-CFSP) domains of EU 
external action (Article 17(1) TEU). To enhance coordination in the realm of EU external 
action, the High Representative takes part in the work of the European Council (Article 15(2) 
TEU), presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18(2) TEU) and holds the post of 
Vice-President of the European Commission (Article 17(4) TEU). This new double, in effect 
triple-hatted role,8 will also become the overall coordinator of EU foreign policy. One of the 
HRVP’s main tasks, crucial in the context of this paper, is to assist the Council and the 
Commission in ensuring coherence between the different areas of the Union’s external action 
and between these and the EU’s other policies (Articles 18(4), 21(3) and 26(2) TEU). When 
properly carried out, the HRVP ought to be able to forge a stronger and more consistent EU 
foreign, security and defence policy, which – potentially – would render the EU a more 
                                                     
6 The most notable exception, however, is Article 216 TFEU, which provides Treaty foundation for the 
power to conclude international agreements, hitherto developed by the ECJ’s case law. 
7 See, for example, P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011, pp. 380-1. 
8 According to Jean-Claude Piris the HRVP is not double- but ‘triple-hatted’ since the position also 
incorporated the function of Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for CFSP 
(SG/HR). See J.-C Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p. 243. However, because the HRVP is also President of the European Defence 
Agency and Chairperson of the board of the EU Institute for Security Studies, the term ‘multi-hatting’ 
would perhaps be even more fitting. For the purpose of this paper, the reference in normal parlance to 
the HRVP’s ‘double-hatted’ nature will be used. 
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effective player on the international scene. Conversely, the potentially conflicting loyalties to 
which the incumbent is exposed could lead to “institutional schizophrenia”.9 
3. The focus and workings of the ‘political’ Commission 
The efficient and legitimate exercise of the European Commission’s right of initiative and 
power of execution is closely linked to the organisation of the College of Commissioners. In 
practice, the internal structure and working methods vary from one Commission to the next. 
During the Barroso II Commission (2009-2014), the high number of ‘line’ Commissioners and 
Directorates (33 DGs and 11 Services) made effective internal coordination difficult.10 The 
‘flat’ internal organisation of the College increased the tendency to negotiate dossiers 
between the President and the respective Commissioner(s) on a bilateral basis rather than 
through discussions within clusters or the entire College. Few decisions were ever put to a 
vote, despite the controversy generated by some of them.11 This practice was 
counterproductive in terms of collegiality and favoured a silo approach to policy-making. In 
fact, this practice stood in stark contrast to the Lisbon Treaty’s spirit of a more holistic and 
integrated approach to dealing with increasing interdependencies between policy areas. 
To address these shortcomings, Barroso’s successor, Jean-Claude Juncker, introduced 
changes to his “Commission of the last chance”.12 The new President not only chose to base 
the Commission’s work on firm political guidelines and to actively promote them,13 he also 
rearranged the structure of the College. The appointment of Frans Timmermans14 as First 
Vice-President responsible for ‘Better Regulation, Inter-institutional Relations, the Rule of 
Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ underlines the importance attached by 
Juncker’s “political” Commission15 to issues that hinge on the trust of citizens and member 
states — thus heeding concerns about, for instance, excessive EU regulation ahead of the 
‘in/out’ referendum in Britain and respect for the rule of law in Hungary.16 
                                                     
9 See Y. Devuyst, “The European Union’s Institutional Balance after the Treaty of Lisbon: ‘Community 
Method’ and ‘Democratic Deficit’ Reassessed”, Georgetown Journal of International Law 39, 2008, pp. 
247-325, at 294-5. 
10 See S. Piedrafita and S. Blockmans, “Shifting EU Institutional Reform into High Gear”, Report of the 
High-level Group Chaired by Danuta Hübner, CEPS, March 2014, p. 4. 
11 See, e.g., the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products, COM (2012) 788. 
12 “Juncker: This will be the ‘last chance Commission’”, Euractiv, 22 October 2014. 
13 Barroso also issued ‘political’ guidelines at the start of his second term. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/about/political/index_en.htm. 
14 A former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands who oversaw a ‘subsidiarity exercise’ across 
the Dutch administration in 2013. See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uitkomsten 
subsidiariteitsexercitie, MINBUZA-2013.184321, 21 June 2013; and C. Lockefeer-Maas (ed.), Balancing 
Competences: Member States in Brussels and Brussels in the Member States, The Hague: ELF, 2015. 
15 See V. Pop, “Let’s Get Political. Juncker-Style”, Wall Street Journal, Real Time Brussels blog, 7 May 
2015. 
16 In a similar vein, see the decision to create a temporary ‘Task Force for Strategic Issues related to the 
UK Referendum’ (European Commission, ‘Continuity and change: Commission appoints new 
Secretary-General and reshuffles its senior management’, Press Release IP/15/5252, Brussels, 24 June 
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The Juncker Commission’s political guidelines involve eight different policy areas, as well as 
the goal to increase the democratic degree of the Union and the mission to turn the EU into a 
stronger global actor.17 These priorities were translated into the Commission Work 
Programme for 2015, which stressed, inter alia, the need to join up all instruments available 
to the Union, including its CFSP.18 The same approach to more coherence in EU foreign 
policy-making is reflected in the Commission’s Work Programme for 2016, which – 
borrowing from the High Representative’s recent assessment of the EU’s strategic 
environment19 – states that: 
In an increasingly connected, contested and complex world marked by dynamic 
changes, the coherence of the EU’s external action and our ability to use all available 
instruments in a joined up manner to achieve our objectives and complement our 
internal policies are ever more important.20 
The new work programme emphasises the Commission’s intention to contribute to the 
process of strategic reflection and to prepare an EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security 
Policy by June 2016, the responsibility for which the European Council has bestowed upon 
the High Representative (“in close cooperation with Member States”).21 
The methodology prescribed by the Commission work programmes effectively mainstreams, 
across all areas of EU external action, the ‘comprehensive approach’ to external conflict and 
crisis that was launched in December 2013.22 This approach prescribes eight measures, each 
connected to a set of concrete actions: 1) developing a shared analysis; 2) defining a common 
strategic vision; 3) focusing on prevention; 4) mobilising the different strengths and 
capacities of the EU; 5) committing to the long term; 6) linking policies and internal and 
external action; 7) making better use of EU Delegations; 8) working in partnership with other 
international and regional actors. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2015) and the decision to continue the ‘Support Group for Ukraine’ (European Commission, ‘Support 
Group for Ukraine’, Press Release IP/14/413, Brussels, 9 April 2014). 
17 J.-C. Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change”, 15 July 2014. 
18 “Commission Work Programme 2015: A New Start”, COM(2014) 910 final, 16 December 2014. In the 
realm of external action, the focus was put on neighbourhood policies (no enlargement during the 
term of the Juncker I Commission; support for ENP countries) and the EU’s development support and 
humanitarian assistance (post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals; fight against Ebola). 
19 “The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex 
world”, 30 June 2015, available at http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-
security-policy-european-union. 
20 “Commission Work Programme 2016: No time for business as usual”, COM(2015) 610 final, 27 
October 2015. Alongside the continuing focus on concretising perspectives for accession and ENP 
countries, the Commission will prioritise crisis management in cooperation with the UN (Syria, Libya) 
and the OSCE (Ukraine); support for security sector governance in partner countries; the presentation 
of a new post-Cotonou policy framework to govern relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries and regions; and support for the HRVP in deepening bilateral relations with the EU’s key 
partners and the development of tailored strategic approaches for, e.g., China and Iran. 
21 EUCO 22/15, 26 June 2015, point 10(b). 
22 Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament and the Council, “The EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises”, JOIN(2013) 30 final, 11 December 2013. 
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The implementation of the comprehensive approach (writ large) is a joint undertaking by the 
High Representative and the Commission that stresses shared responsibilities with the 
member states and thus presumes their active cooperation in achieving the declared goals of 
EU external action. It is in this context that the hybrid nature of Mogherini’s position is 
important: with one foot in the Council and another in the Commission, the HRVP is 
uniquely placed to induce and leverage political will among the member states by using the 
Union’s instruments, budget and expertise managed by the European Commission. 
As noted above, the re-organisation of the Commission’s portfolios responded to the political 
guidelines presented by the Commission President-designate to the European Parliament in 
July 2014. Stressing the “need to be more effective in bringing together the tools of Europe’s 
external action” Juncker expressed his expectation that the next High Representative would 
combine national and European tools, and all the tools available in the Commission, 
in a more effective way than in the past. He or she must act in concert with our 
European Commissioners for Trade, Development and Humanitarian Aid as well as 
for Neighbourhood Policy. This will require the High Representative to more fully 
play his/her role within the College of Commissioners.  
In his Mission Letter of 1 November 2014 to Mogherini (and each of the other 
Commissioners), Juncker reiterated his expectation that she would play her role as Vice-
President to the full.23 To underline her role as VP Mogherini took the symbolic decision to 
install her office and cabinet in the Commission’s Berlaymont building; to appoint Stefano 
Manservisi, an experienced hand at the Commission, as her chef de cabinet; and to recruit half 
of her cabinet from Commission staff. The suggestion that, in case of need, Commissioner 
Hahn and other Commissioners could deputise for her “in areas related to Commission 
competence”24 also points in this direction, as indeed to the Juncker Commission’s flexibility 
in re-organising its own structures to match priorities. 
Whereas a reduction of the number of Commissioners continues to be legally and politically 
unrealistic, clustering the Commissioners with related portfolios (energy; jobs, growth, 
investment & competitiveness; digital single market; the euro; external action) was arguably 
the best option to enhance collegial decision-making and improve the independence, 
efficiency and transparency of the European Commission. Bringing together several 
portfolios, each under the leadership of a Vice-President, the groups of Commissioners now 
present their common position for the College to decide upon, as laid down in the 
Commission’s Working Methods.25 As a general rule, the President does not place a new 
initiative on the agenda of the College “unless this is recommended to [him] by one of the 
Vice-Presidents on the basis of sound arguments and a clear narrative that is coherent with 
the priority projects of the Political Guidelines”.26  
                                                     
23 Juncker’s Mission Letter to Mogherini is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/mogherini_en.pdf.  
24 Ibid., p. 4. 
25 Communication from the President to the Commission, “The Working Methods of the European 
Commission 2014-2019”, C(2014) 9004, 11 November 2014. The principle of collegiality, which governs 
decision-making in the Commission (Article 17(6) TEU), guarantees the equal participation of all the 
Commissioners and the collective responsibility for the decisions taken.  
26 See, e.g., Mission Letter to Mogherini, p. 2. A strong bond to the College is also ensured by 
Mogherini’s obligation to regularly report back to Juncker and to the whole College about 
“geopolitical developments”. Ibid, p. 4. 
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Juncker considers it VP Mogherini’s responsibility to steer and coordinate the Commission’s 
work regarding all external matters in order to deliver a coherent approach for EU external 
action. Mogherini herself has repeatedly expressed her intention to implement the mandate 
given to her by Juncker. She did so even before she took up office, as evidenced during her 
hearing in the European Parliament on 6 October 2014 and in her answers to the prior 
questionnaire.27 Rather than spell out a vision of how to flesh out this responsibility in 
practical terms, Mogherini went straight to work, supposedly relying on trial-and-error 
tactics. Given this hands-on approach, one needs to piece together her ‘acquis’ to see whether 
she has been successful. We do so below by first investigating the role and functioning of the 
reactivated Commissioners’ Group on External Action (section 4), and subsequently by 
exploring other forms of cooperation between Mogherini and Commissioners, such as the 
preparation of joint proposals and the delivery of joint statements (section 5). 
4. Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA) 
4.1 Mandate, composition and procedures 
The first Commission to work under the regime of the Lisbon Treaty was the second one 
presided over by José Manuel Barroso. When Barroso, in his capacity as Commission 
President-designate, unveiled his new team of Commissioners in November 2009, he added 
an asterisk behind the names of three designated Commissioners, i.e. those responsible for 
‘International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis response’ (Kristalina Georgieva), 
‘Development’ (Andris Piebalgs) and ‘Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy’ 
(Stefan Füle), who would be expected to exercise their functions “in close cooperation with 
the High Representative/Vice-President in accordance with the Treaties”.28 Five months 
later, Barroso issued an Information Note in which VP Catherine Ashton was tasked with 
chairing the meetings of the Commissioners’ Group responsible for ‘External relations’, 
which was composed of the three aforementioned Commissioners and widened to include 
the portfolios of ‘Trade’ (Karel De Gucht) and ‘Economic and Monetary Affairs’ (Olli Rehn).29 
The Note also provided that “the President can decide to attend any meeting, which he will 
then chair”. Ashton convened the Group a number of times. Each time she was sidelined by 
Barroso, who would insist on chairing the meeting. It is said that the gatherings had a rather 
formalistic character and added no value to the normal inter-service consultation processes 
in the Commission, let alone to the goal of joining up the Commission’s strands of EU 
external action with those managed by the Council and the EEAS. The practice of convening 
the Group was quietly abandoned.  
With the dual aim of achieving greater coherence in EU foreign policy making and greater 
efficiency in the consistency and effectiveness of its implementation, President Juncker 
                                                     
27 Answers to the European Parliament, Questionnaire to the Commissioner-designate Federica 
Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President 
of the Commission, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings-2014/resources/questions-
answers/Hearings2014_Mogherini_Questionnaire_en.pdf. 
28 See Press release IP/09/1837 of 27 November 2009. The requirement of close cooperation was 
repeated in his Mission Letters of the same date to Piebalgs and Füle, and of 27 January 2010 to 
Georgieva. See http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/mission_letters/index_en.htm. 
29 Information Note from the President, “Commissioners groups”, SEC(2010) 475 final, 22 April 2010. 
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reanimated the Commissioners’ Group on External Action.30 In his Mission Letters to all 
Commissioners, President Juncker stressed that the Commission’s work on external action 
would be subject to coordination and streamlining by Federica Mogherini as the leading 
Vice-President. In concrete terms, Juncker instructed Mogherini to guide the work of the 
Commissioners for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations 
(Johannes Hahn), International Cooperation and Development (Neven Mimica), 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management (Christos Stylianides), and Trade (Cecilia 
Malmström).31 Taken together, VP Mogherini and these four Commissioners form the core of 
the CGEA.  
On 11 November 2014, Juncker issued a Decision in which the mandate and composition of 
the Commissioners’ Group were formalised.32 That Decision also lays down the basic 
procedural rules for the functioning of the CGEA. The Group meets every month for 1 to 2 
hours and is chaired by VP Mogherini.33 All members of the core group are always expected 
to attend. Yet, the distinctive feature of the CGEA lies in its flexible design: Commissioners 
who do not belong to the pre-defined cluster but who are nevertheless concerned by the 
items on the Group’s agenda are also invited. This practice was anticipated in Juncker’s 
Mission Letter to Mogherini, in which she was informed that she could also draw on the 
policy instruments and expertise under the responsibilities of the Commissioners whose 
portfolios have strong external dimensions, in particular those for Migration and Home 
Affairs (Dimitris Avramopoulos), Climate Action and Energy (Miguel Arias Cañete), and 
Transport (Violeta Bulc), who belong to her broader cluster. Due to the blurring of 
boundaries between internal and external policy areas, the fact that the CGEA meets on a 
regular basis and caters for real political debates between Commissioners, the Group’s 
meeting has at times ballooned in size,34 especially as each of them normally comes with his 
or her Director-General.  
The CGEA is supported by a joint secretariat, which is led by the Head of Unit ‘International 
Dimension’ of the Secretariat-General of the Commission and the Head of Division ‘Policy 
Coordination’ of the EEAS. The joint secretariat assists the cabinets of Mogherini and Juncker 
in establishing the agenda for the upcoming meetings of the CGEA. Since the Group follows 
a four-week interval, it is less suitable to discuss short-term matters and crisis management 
but is rather designed to work on more structural issues and long-term trends. Hence, the 
                                                     
30 Initially, the group was referred to as a Project Team on “Europe in the World”: 
http://ec.europa.eu/about/structure/index_en.htm#ta.  
31 It has to be noted that relations between VP Mogherini and Trade Commissioner Malmström are 
unique in at least three ways. First, Malmström’s portfolio is primarily subject to the supervision by 
VP Jyrki Katainen (Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness). Second, she is obliged to report on 
the outcome of the TTIP Group meetings to the CGEA, and hence functions as a link between both 
groups (see below). Finally, on the side of the member states, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) for 
Trade is the only FAC formation to be chaired by the rotating Presidency and not by HR Mogherini 
(see Annex 3). 
32 Decision of the President of the European Commission on the Creation of a Commissioners’ Group 
on External Action, C(2014) 9003, 11 November 2014.  
33 Mogherini set an example by holding the very first informal CGEA meeting only hours after the 
new Commission was voted in by the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 22 October 2014. Since 
then the CGEA has met every month, except in August 2015 because of the summer holidays. 
34 Discussions may touch upon the energy union (Maroš Šefčovič), the environment, maritime affairs 
and fisheries (Karmenu Vella) or industrial harmonisation of the defence sector (Elzbieta Bieńkowska), 
to name just a few. 
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agenda usually comprises three items of either a geographical or thematic nature.35 The joint 
secretariat determines which of the Commissioners will prepare inputs and which one takes 
the lead. As such, the secretariat is able to control the appropriate size of the meetings and 
prevent the Group from falling prey to its own popularity. 
In this context, it is also worth observing that a Commissioners’ Group on the Transatlantic 
Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP) was created in March 2015 to prepare negotiations with 
the US. Like the CGEA, this group was set up by a formal President Decision which, 
however, defines the First Vice-President (Frans Timmermans) and the Vice-President for 
Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness (Jyrki Katainen) as the co-chairs. The 
Secretariat-General of the Commission acts as the secretariat of this Group and the 
Commissioners for Trade (Cecilia Malmström), Agriculture and Rural Development (Phil 
Hogan), Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (Elzbieta Bieńkowska), 
Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (Jonathan Hill), 
Competition (Margrethe Vestager), Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs 
(Pierre Moscovici), and Health and Food Safety (Vytenis Andriukaitis) all participate. Trade 
Commissioner Malmström occupies a special position as her presence is needed for the 
Group’s meetings to take place.36 Also, she is expected to report on the outcome of the TTIP 
Group meetings to the CGEA and hence functions as a link between both groups. 
Two weeks before the meetings of the CGEA, representatives from the cabinets concerned 
(usually Heads or Deputy Heads accompanied by the DGs’ Head of Unit responsible for 
international issues) gather to coordinate their Commissioners’ positions. These cabinet 
coordination meetings are chaired by Mogherini’s chef de cabinet and based on 1-page issue 
papers prepared by coordinators from the services concerned. A limited number of ‘B-points’ 
(i.e. policy issues upon which no consensus could be reached) are formulated into questions 
for a political discussion at CGEA level.37 
The CGEA does not have the power to adopt official decisions and does not replace the 
standard procedure of decision-making within the Commission (see section 5). As a 
reflection thereof, the secretariat does not draw up any formal conclusions but takes minutes 
of the meetings. Like the agendas, these minutes are not made public. The joint secretariat 
also serves as the institutional memory of the Group in order to secure follow-up at cabinet 
level. In a similar vein, it watches over the Group’s functioning and implements lessons 
learnt of a technical nature. 
4.2 Value added 
From the description above it becomes clear that the Commissioners’ Group on External 
Action serves at least four main functions. First, the CGEA facilitates political discussion on 
EU external action across the entire Commission. As such, it provides a platform for some 
                                                     
35 E.g., Turkey; China; Myanmar; the Strategy for Syria and Iraq; Eastern partners; economic 
diplomacy; 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; capacity-building (train & equip); cultural 
diplomacy; post-COP 21 climate diplomacy; 2016 Afghanistan conference; responsible supply chains; 
action plan for human rights and migration. The CGEA does not prepare summits, for which there is a 
separate procedure.
 
36 The TTIP Group, whose substantive remit is  narrower than that of the CGEA, does not meet 
according to a regular schedule but whenever needed, for instance to prepare or study opening bids 
for tariff negotiations. 
37 Budgetary issues such as the re-allocation of funds to address new realities are dealt with at 'cab 
coordination' level and do not usually get passed on to the CGEA. 
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Commissioners and services that hitherto did not benefit from a comprehensive coordination 
forum but had to rely on less systematic bilateral liaison at the administrative level (e.g. DG 
ECHO). 
Second, with its high-level political discussions it supplements the standard inter-service 
consultation procedure in the Commission. Due to the compressed format, only the 
Commissioners who are concerned and hence also knowledgeable about the issues at stake 
are present. This small and high-level expert group is thus able to host a constructive and 
solution-orientated debate, which alleviates some of the stress on the College.38  
Third, cooperation between Commissioners in the CGEA forces the services to abandon their 
silo mentalities, share information and create linkages to give ‘hands and feet’ to a more 
comprehensive approach to EU external action. As such, the Commissioners’ Group serves 
to ‘deconflict’, both between the Directorates General of the Commission and with the EEAS. 
Fourth, as the logical counterpart of the Foreign Affairs Council, the Commissioners’ Group 
enables the HRVP to play her role to the full and deliver on her duty to assist the Council 
and the Commission to ensure consistency in EU external action (Article 21(3) TEU). 
Mogherini acts as a coordinator to mobilise instruments, budget and expertise managed by 
the Commission and to capitalise on a political consensus reached in the Council. A concrete 
example concerns the adoption by the Commission of a legislative proposal offering 
additional temporary access for Tunisian olive oil to the EU market to help support Tunisia’s 
recovery in the wake of the terrorist attack of 26 June 2015 in Sousse,39 which had prompted 
a reaction from the FAC on 20 July 2015 on the need to further assist Tunisia in its political 
and economic transition, in a concrete and targeted manner. Conversely, Mogherini is in a 
position to induce political will among member states by showing that the tools managed by 
the Commission can be put at the Union’s disposal in order to boost effective foreign policy. 
A good example of this go-getting attitude is the cascade of actions she set off in response to 
a spike in the refugee crisis in February 2015: 
We cannot allow other tragedies at sea in the coming weeks and months; we need to 
be able to give a strong political and operational response. As I have announced 
today during the College in Strasbourg, I will convene an extraordinary meeting of 
the Commissioners’ Group on External Action in the coming days in order to discuss 
with the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris 
Avramopoulos, a review of our policies. I’ve also decided to put a discussion on 
migration on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council soon. The fight against 
smuggling and trafficking, the rescue of migrants at sea, the protection of asylum 
seekers are shared challenges; they require a stronger exercise of shared 
responsibility.40 
After liaising with her fellow Commissioners in the extraordinary CGEA devoted to the 
refugee crisis, she issued a joint statement, together with First Vice-President Timmermans 
and Commissioner Avramopoulos, announcing progress made by the Commission on a 
‘European Agenda on Migration’ and underlining that migration is a “cross-cutting issue, 
                                                     
38 Apart from the situation in Ukraine and the refugee crisis, which have featured regularly on the 
College’s agenda, other EU foreign policy issues have largely been dealt with in the CGEA. 
39 Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and the Council on the introduction of emergency autonomous 
trade measures for Tunisia, COM(2015) 460, 17 September 2015. 
40 http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150210_03_en.htm 
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involving different policy areas different actors”.41 Mogherini then put ‘migration’ on the 
agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council in March (the first in 10 years to discuss the 
phenomenon). There it was decided to organise an extraordinary meeting of Ministers and 
Interior Ministers on April 20th. This first-ever joint ministerial prepared the first ‘special’ 
European Council meeting on the refugee crisis on April 23rd, just days after the deadliest 
shipwreck in the Mediterranean to date, which claimed more than 800 lives. After having 
garnered political will to act among member states, she and her two fellow Commissioners 
launched the comprehensive ‘European Agenda on Migration’ in May. Mogherini has been 
instrumental in keeping the external dimension of the refugee crisis on the agenda since.42 
By bridging the ‘rue de la Loi’ divide between the EU institutions, Mogherini is able to pull 
together the different strands of EU external action in a truly more comprehensive fashion. In 
fact, it has become difficult to distinguish between the HR and VP roles. Fortunately, the 
buck does not stop with the HRVP: her cabinet members also possess a hybrid character, 
since their portfolios contain support for both the High Representative and the Vice-
President. Further reference to the strong interdependencies of Mogherini’s HR and VP 
capacities can be found in the participation of at least one Commissioner (e.g. Hahn 11x; 
Mimica 5x) in the Foreign Affairs Council;43 the participation of the EEAS in the joint 
secretariat of the CGEA; the creation of two ‘joint’ task forces for the preparation of the 2015 
ENP Review and the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy; the participation of 
a representative of the Commission’s Secretariat General in the meetings of the Political and 
Security Committee; and the encouragement of EEAS staff to consult and cooperate with the 
Commission where appropriate, something that was not expected or even actively 
discouraged under HRVP Ashton.44 A peek into the spokesperson’s service of the 
Commission reveals another interesting element in this regard: this newly integrated 
structure provides two spokespersons for foreign and security policy, seconded from the 
EEAS, with offices in the Berlaymont building.45 This allows them to better blend the HR’s 
and VP’s registers into a single voice. 
In order to improve our understanding of the extent to which Mogherini has used her hybrid 
position to inject the Lisbon spirit into the functioning of the Commission, we will now 
analyse a series of public types of expressions: her joint initiatives, statements and visits with 
fellow Commissioners. 
                                                     
41 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4545_en.htm. 
42 In the EEAS database in the timeframe between 10 February and 31 October are 57 entries in the 
category ‘migration’. 
43 See Annex 3. Mogherini cannot play her VP role in the FAC as she chairs the meetings in her 
capacity as High Representative. 
44 This is particularly relevant for cases where the EEAS prepares documents (e.g. for the FAC, CGEA, 
and joint communications) which touch upon Commission competences. The practice goes both ways, 
i.e. Commission staff is expected to consult the EEAS whenever appropriate. 
45 One of the two is simultaneously spokesperson for neighbourhood policy and enlargement 
negotiations. 
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5. Joint initiatives, statements and visits46 
Since the Commissioners’ Group on External Action is not authorised to adopt official 
decisions, the CGEA does not aim to replace but rather to buttress the standard procedure of 
decision-making within the Commission, i.e. the inter-service consultation. This 
administrative procedure is launched on the initiative of a Commissioner, in agreement with 
his/her liaison Vice-President, and is intended to include and inform all services that have a 
legitimate interest in the proposal.47 This procedure is designed to correspond to the 
principle of collegiality and be geared towards the adoption of coherent policy documents 
and legal measures. Once the administrative procedure is completed, the drafts proceed to 
the political level, where they are first discussed in the ‘Hebdo’ (weekly) meeting of Heads of 
Cabinet before the College decides on them. 
Documents that are subject to this process and relevant in the context of the current paper 
are Joint Communications, Proposals, Reports, Consultative Papers and Decisions, which are 
issued by the Commission in cooperation with the High Representative. Twenty of these 
joint documents can be traced in the Juncker Commissions’ first year in office (see Annex 1). 
Which of the Commissioners and Vice-Presidents initiated these documents is not clear but 
can be traced by identifying the supporting financial instruments. By doing so, it is evident 
that Mogherini often cooperates with Commissioner Mimica on development (9x) and with 
Commissioner Hahn on neighbourhood issues (5x). By working closely with these two 
Commissioners, who fall under her authority as Vice-President, Mogherini not only 
underlines her strong cluster affiliation, but also her unifying approach to her hybrid 
position as HRVP. 
As for joint statements, these are initiated and arranged by the respective cabinets in 
cooperation with the Spokesperson’s service of the Commission. The rapid increase in joint 
statements since the new Commission took office is rather striking: Mogherini issued 36 joint 
statements with fellow Commissioners in her first year in office (Annex 2). By comparison, 
Catherine Ashton issued only six statements with her fellow Commissioners in her last year 
in office (1 November 2013 until 31 October 2014). Mogherini put a strong emphasis on her 
core group, by cooperating a total of 31 times with Commissioners Hahn (12x), Stylianides 
(16x), Mimica (8x) and/or Malmström (2x). The explanation for this lies partly in the higher 
number of (humanitarian) crises in the geographical neighbourhood of the Union in the last 
year, partly in the particular attachment of Mogherini to outreach,48 and partly in the pursuit 
of a more comprehensive approach to EU external action. As far as the latter is concerned, 
one notes the joint statements with Commissioner Avramopoulos (3x) but none with 
                                                     
46 Several databases were scanned for this purpose: http://eeas.europa.eu/news/index_en.htm; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm; http://www.federicamogherini.net/blog-archive/?lang=en; 
and http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html. As before, the 'polling' period is 1 November 2014 
until 31 October 2015. Other forms of cooperation (e.g. joint press releases) were excluded from this 
analysis as they are more difficult to track and the completeness of the dataset could therefore not be 
guaranteed. The cooperation between the High Representative and Commissioner Bieńkowska 
(Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship & SME's) is worth mentioning, however, as expressed in 
a joint cover letter to European Council President Donald Tusk regarding European defence matters, 
ARES(2015)2133745, 5 May 2015. 
47 Communication from the President to the Commission, “The Working Methods of the European 
Commission 2014-2019”, C(2014)9004, 11 November 2014, p. 7. 
48 Quite telling, in this respect, is her own (extra-EU) website: www.federicamogherini.net. 
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Commissioners Cañete and Bulc, all belonging to the broader cluster on external action. As 
mentioned above, she did, however, cooperate with First Vice-President Frans Timmermans 
(4x) and also with Commissioners Jourova (Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality; 3x) and 
Thyssen (Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility; 3x). 
Another politically significant form of cooperation are the joint visits of Mogherini and 
fellow Commissioners to third countries. In her first year in office, she only visited Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, accompanied by Commissioner Hahn, and Turkey together with Hahn 
and Stylianides, both in a single week in December 2014. Whereas agendas of busy 
Commissioners may be difficult to align with that of the omnipresent HRVP, the information 
about upcoming public appearances shared in the CGEA could no doubt be put to better use 
to leverage joint visits and thereby send more powerful political signals outside of the EU. 
6. Conclusion 
The reactivation of the Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA) represents one of 
the most important institutional initiatives to EU foreign policy-making since the merger of 
the position of the High Representative for CFSP with that of Vice-President of the 
Commission and the creation of the European External Action Service. In its first year of 
activities, this Group has injected much-needed political pragmatism into the way the 
Commission contributes to EU external action. As a result, the CGEA has greatly facilitated 
inter-service cooperation, both within the Commission and with the EEAS, without replacing 
the standard inter-service consultation procedure geared towards formal decision-making in 
the Commission. As such, the CGEA represents one of the – if not the – most developed form 
of cluster cooperation in the Juncker Commission. The new CGEA has in fact become the 
logical counterpart of the Foreign Affairs Council, which allows the HRVP to deliver on her 
duty to assist the Council and the Commission in ensuring a comprehensive approach to EU 
external action, and indeed consistency, in its implementation. The CGEA is a political 
facilitator that has undoubtedly improved the Union’s track record in terms of coherence and 
visibility. To a great extent, the success of the CGEA is the result of the pragmatic approach 
that Federica Mogherini has adopted in instrumentalising political will in an inter-
institutional context. Overall effectiveness is, of course, more difficult to assess. But an 
analysis of her joint initiatives, statements and visits with fellow Commissioners provides 
further evidence that the contours of the political space she has created are determined by a 
unifying approach to her hybrid position. Taken together, this drive towards greater internal 
coherence should help the EU in being more effective in an increasingly complex and 
conflicted world. 
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Annex 1. Joint initiatives of the European Commission and the High Representative 
Number Type Date Title Financial Instruments Directorates-General* 
JOIN/2015/0033 Joint 
Cons 
P 
06 Oct 2015 Towards a new partnership between the European Union and 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020  
European Development Fund (EDF); 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
DEVCO 
JOIN/2015/0040 Joint 
Com 
09 Sep 2015 Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU 
External Action 
Syria Trust Fund and proposal for creation of 
European Emergency Trust Fund for stability;   
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 
NEAR; DEVCO 
JOIN/2015/0032 Joint 
Dec 
 27 Aug 2015  On the participation of the European Union in various 
organisations for cooperation to prevent and counter 
terrorism 
Global Community Engagement and Resilience 
Fund (non EU); Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace  (IcSP) 
DEVCO; ECHO 
JOIN/2015/0029 Joint 
Prop 
07 Aug 2015 On the signature of the Agreement continuing the 
International Science and Technology Center between 
the European Union and EURATOM acting as one Party 
and Georgia, Japan, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of 
Tajikistan, and the United States of America 
IcSP DEVCO; ECHO 
JOIN/2015/0024 Joint 
Prop 
01 May 2015 On the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and 
provisional application of the Enhanced Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 
DCI DEVCO 
JOIN/2015/0022 Joint 
Com 
18 May 2015 The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with a strategic purpose Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR); DCI 
DEVCO 
JOIN/2015/0017 Joint 
Com 
28 April 2015 Capacity building in support of security and development - 
Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises  
IcSP; IPA; The European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI); DCI; EIDHR; Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget 
NEAR; DEVCO; ECHO 
JOIN/2015/0016 Joint 
Com 
28 April.2015 Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2015-2019) 
"Keeping human rights at the heart of the EU agenda"  
EIDHR DEVCO 
JOIN/2015/0013 Joint 
Rep 
24 April 2015 Macao Special Administrative Region: 2014 Annual Report  N/A - 
JOIN/2015/0012 Joint 
Rep 
24 April 2015 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Annual Report 
2014  
N/A  
JOIN/2015/0010 Joint 
Prop 
13 April 2015 On the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and 
provisional application of the Strategic Partnership 
Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and Canada, of the other part 
N/A - 
JOIN/2015/0009 Joint 
Com 
25 Mar 2015 Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
2014 
ENI; Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF); 
DCFTA Facility; Civil Society Facility (CSF), 
NEAR 
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Regional Trust Fund  
JOIN/2015/0008 Joint 
Prop 
12 Mar 2015 Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 314/2004 concerning 
certain restrictive measures in respect of Zimbabwe  
N/A - 
JOIN/2015/0006 Joint 
Cons 
P 
04 Mar 2015 Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy ENI NEAR 
JOIN/2015/0004 Joint 
Prop 
18 Feb 2015 On the Union position within the Association Council 
established by the Association Agreement between the 
European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community 
and its Member States, of the one part and Ukraine, of the 
other part with regard to the adoption of a Recommendation 
on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda 
N/A NEAR  
JOIN/2015/0002 Joint 
Com 
06 Feb 2015 Elements for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well 
as the Da'esh threat 
IcSP; ENI; Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) budget 
DEVCO; NEAR; ECHO 
JOIN/2015/0001 Joint 
Prop 
22 Jan 2015 Amending Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities 
and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine  
N/A - 
JOIN/2014/0042 Joint 
Prop 
15 Dec 2014 Amending Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning 
restrictive measures against Iran 
N/A - 
JOIN/2014/0041 Joint 
Prop 
05 Dec 2014 Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 174/2005 imposing 
restrictions on the supply of assistance related to military 
activities to Côte d’Ivoire  
N/A - 
JOIN/2014/0037 Joint 
Prop 
06 Nov 2014 Amending Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive 
measures in view of the situation in Syria 
N/A - 
Total number: 20 
*The EEAS participates in all listed cases. 
Source: Authors’ own compilation; November 2014 – October 2015. 
Joint Cons P = Joint Consultation Paper 
Joint Com = Joint Communication 
Joint Dec = Joint Decision 
Joint Prop = Joint Proposal 
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Annex 2. Joint statements of the HRVP and Commissioners 
Table 1. Joint statements of Mogherini and Commissioners of her cluster 
Date Type Commissioner 
12 October 2015 Presidential elections Belarus Hahn 
10 October 2015 Bomb attack Ankara Hahn 
02 October 2015 Yemen Stylianides 
26 September 2015 Follow up UN Sustainable Development Summit in 
New York 
Mimica 
17 September 2015 Earthquake in Chile Stylianides 
01 September 2015 Sentencing of Khadija Ismayilova in Azerbaijan Hahn 
26 August 2015 Signature by President Kiir of the peace agreement for 
South Sudan 
Stylianides, Mimica 
22 August 2015 Release of political prisoners in Belarus Hahn 
20 August 2015 Bombings in Yemen of port facilities in Hodeida Stylianides 
19 August 15 Support to UNRWA Stylianides, Hahn 
17 August 15 Latest indiscriminate attacks against the Syrian people Stylianides 
13 August 15 Explosions in China's northern port city of Tianjin Stylianides 
28 July 2015 Reform Agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina Hahn 
10 July 2015 Yemen Stylianides 
03 July 2015 Crisis in Yemen Stylianides 
20 June 2015 Signature of the Malian Peace Agreement Mimica 
08 June 2015 General elections in Turkey Hahn 
11 May 2015 Proposed truce in Yemen Stylianides 
11 May 2015 Worsening conflict in South Sudan Stylianides 
07 May 2015 EU's participation in the Labour Rights' Initiative in 
Myanmar   
Malmström, Thyssen, 
Mimica 
24 April 2015 Progress in Bangladesh Sustainability Compact Malmström, Thyssen, 
Mimica 
10 April 2015 Situation in Yarmouk, Syria Stylianides 
01 April 2015 Impact of fighting in Yemen Stylianides 
   
02 March 2015 11th European Development Fund (EDF) Mimica 
18 February 2015 Formation of the government in the Republic of 
Moldova 
Hahn 
10 February 2015 Death of aid worker Kayla Mueller Stylianides 
14 December 2014 Police raids and arrests of media representatives in 
Turkey 
Hahn 
09 December 2014 The formation of the new government in Kosovo Hahn 
01 December 2014 Parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova Hahn 
22 November 2014 President elections Tunisia Hahn 
16 November 2014 The murder of US aid worker Peter Kassig Stylianides 
 Number joint statements cluster: 31 
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Table 2. Joint statements of Mogherini and other Commissioners 
Date Type Commissioner 
06 August 2015 Recent incident in the Mediterranean Timmermans, Avramopoulos 
10 March 2015 European Day of Remembrance of Victims of 
Terrorism 
Timmermans, Avramopoulos and 
Jourová 
08 March 2015 International Women's Day Timmermans, Mimica, Thyssen, 
Avramopoulos, Stylianides, Jourová 
28 November 14 Remarks following conferences for the Rabat 
Process and the Khartoum Process 
Avramopoulos 
24 November 14 International Day for the Elimination of 
Violence against Women 
Jourová, Mimica 
 Number joint statements non-cluster: 5 
 Total number joint statements: 36 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation; November 2014 – October 2015. 
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Annex 3. Foreign Affairs Council meetings 
Date Formation Chair Participating Commissioners 
17/18 Nov 2014 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Hahn, Stylianides, Bieńkowska, 
Mimica 
21 Nov 2014 Trade Calenda (Deputy Minister for 
Economic Development, Italy) 
Malmström 
12  Dec 2014 Development Mogherini Mimica, Vella, Stylianides 
15  Dec 2014 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Hahn 
19  Jan 2015 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Hahn, Cañete, Avramopoulos 
29  Jan 2015 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Hahn 
09  Feb 2015 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Hahn, Mimica 
16  Mar 2015 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Hahn, Mimica 
20  Apr 2015 Joint Foreign and 
Interior affairs 
Mogherini Hahn 
07  May 2015 Trade Rinkevics (Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Latvia) 
Malmström 
18  May 2015 Defence Mogherini Hahn, Bieńkowska, Avramopoulos  
26  May 2015 Development Mogherini Mimica, Vella,  
28/29 May 2015 Competitiveness  Reizniece-Ozola (Minister for 
Economics, Latvia) 
Jourová, Bieńkowska, Oettinger, 
Moedas 
22 Jun 2015 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Šefčovič, Hahn 
20 Jul 2015 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Hahn 
12 Oct 2015 Foreign Affairs Mogherini Hahn 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation; November 2014 - October 2015. 
 
 
